Captain Skyhawk ([info]epictetus_rex) wrote in [info]philosophy,
@ 2006-06-24 09:46:00
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Naturalism
Could someone please explain naturalism to me? The more I look into it, the more meaningless and trivial it looks. Here are two definitions of naturalism:

"a species of philosophical monism according to which whatever exists or happens is natural in the sense of being susceptible to explanation through methods which, although paradigmatically exemplified in the natural sciences, are continuous from domain to domain of objects and events...[thus, there cannot] exist any entities or events which lie, in principle, beyond the scope of scientific explanation" (Danto, 1967, p. 448);

"the twofold view that (1) everything is composed of natural entities--those studied in the sciences--whose properties determine all the properties of things, persons included, ...abstract entities... like possibilities...and mathematical objects...and (2) acceptable methods of justification and explanation are commensurable, in some sense, with those in science" (Post, 1995, p. 517);


So, generally, naturalism is the view that (1) all phenomena are "natural", and (2) the way to discover and evaluate such phenomena is by applying the methods of science.

(1) The naturalist sees a rock rise in the air and says: "that is a natural event". The non-naturalist says: "that might be a supernatural event". Um: WHO THE HELL CARES. I can't believe we're arguing over what a few specialized thinkers decide to call certain events.

(2) "The methods of science"? I don't get it. Is this supposed to rule out internal, "mystical" experience as real evidence, in favour of publicly observable fact? I don't see how it does. The rock rises in the air. The non-naturalist considers the possibility that she is moving it with her mind, whereas the naturalist looks for magnetic or gravitational forces. Has anyone ever "seen" gravity? Is it publicly observable? How is gravity any less mysterious than telekinesis?

So, what I'm gathering here is that naturalism calls things natural and favours certain modes of explanation over others because they have been successful in the past. This position is obviously vulnerable to Hume's problem of induction, and is also an easy target for the scientific relativist: given that, in the past, every single other description of the "fundamental modes of explanation" has been wrong, how can the naturalist defend his position that he's got the right ones?



I'm at a loss to understand the philosophical worth of naturalism. More and more it looks to me like an inconsistent doctrine which simply wants to exclude certain kinds of people (astrologers, mystics, etc.) from the explanation-game. This may be a worthy goal, but it is not a strictly rational goal. Help me out, here.

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[info]lovethelogos
2006-06-24 05:41 pm UTC (link)
who cares?

people argue about semantics and language to the point of extreme division and argument.

wouldn't metaphysics be something worth arguing about?

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[info]lovethelogos
2006-06-24 05:41 pm UTC (link)
and yes. getting rid of superstitutious explanation is the idea.

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[info]lovethelogos
2006-06-25 06:19 am UTC (link)
geeze, my comment sounded so condescending.
sorry!

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[info]synapsomatic
2006-06-24 05:53 pm UTC (link)
First and foremost, there is no definition of naturalism, just like there is no definition of feminism, for each naturalist will most likely give you a different definition with a different set of goals. I ran across this problem when I took a class on naturalism and could not find a set definition of it. There are so many different shades of it. It's also hard because you don't have philosophers who just come right out and say simply, "I'm a naturalist." You are left to infer from their arguments whether they are or not. There are, however, some books of debates between naturalists and non-naturalists. And don't get hung up it being called 'naturalism' to take the opposing side to imply supernatural events. It's poorly named, because that's not what the debate is about.

The only help I can provide is a little bit, as again, it's hard to talk about naturalism as if it were just one single and unified position, but it's not. At the most basic foundation of naturalism is a rejection of traditional metaphysics. The kind of metaphysics that naturalists want to do is essentially the kind that follows from scientific findings. A great example is the philosophy of mind. Some naturalists are going to make the very bold claims that a "complete" science will be able to answer all questions, so ultimately, everything is of a kind that is answerable by science. So, anything philosophy comes up with cannot be outright unscientific or completely outside the scope of philosophy. We (obviously) do not have a "complete" science, so current science cannot answer these questions, so it is up to us philosophers. Other naturalists will say that not everything is of a kind that is answerable by science, but in the very least, it cannot contradict anything in science; science serves as the measure or standard. So when we talk about the nature of the mind, everything we say must at least be consistent and compatible with science. And everything we say must be something that follows from science; there can't be anything that we say that we come up with from something completely outside of science.

It's not just ruling out "mystical" explanations, it's ruling out all of traditional metaphysics. If you want to talk about properties and how they inhere in things, we develop that based on what science says about the structure of things.

All of this is so problematic in so many ways. First of all, what counts as science? And second of all, how do you deal with respectable scientists who radically disagree with each other? Even the beloved benchmark for all naturalists, physics, is filled with physicists who oppose each other in some very fundamental ideas. So, naturalists just end up attaching themselves to specific scientists, because "science" hardly points to anything, it involves too much conflict and disagreement. Do we allow psychology as science? Sociology? How do we draw the line?

Another problem with naturalism is that it cannot allow us to question the methods of science. The methods just work, and science shows us they work. lol. (You can imagine there are a lot of fists beating on tables in discussions about this sort of thing. haha.)

Again, I would stress that there are about as many brands of naturalism as there are philosophers who would claim to be naturalists. If you want to get to know it, you just have to get to know their theories. It's easy to try to come up with a definition that ends up being too easy to refute, like the monistic, materialistic kind of position that the Churchlands take; but not very many are that extreme.

Perhaps this may help, it's the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article on Naturalized Epistemology, which is where naturalism began, with Quine. And the bibliography might point you in some directions.

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Oops, correction.
[info]synapsomatic
2006-06-24 05:55 pm UTC (link)
Second paragraph, middle of the paragraph:

"So, anything philosophy comes up with cannot be outright unscientific or completely outside the scope of science."

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[info]synapsomatic
2006-06-24 06:11 pm UTC (link)
Reliabilism regarding justification in epistemology is, I think, a common position held by naturalists, at least that was my impression.

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[info]i_am_lane
2006-06-24 06:33 pm UTC (link)
Yes; so is probabilism. In fact, externalism was motivated by naturalism.

However, given the spectacular failure of externalism, some internalists have been developing naturalized epistemologies, although none so radical as Quine.

For [info]epictetus_rex -- there are broadly two categories of naturalism -- metholodical naturalism (the methods of philosophy should be empirically responsible and in some sense contiguous with the methods of the natural sciences) and ontological naturalism, which states that every entity is accessible to the methods of the natural sciences.

One may be an m-naturalist without being an o-naturalist.

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[info]synapsomatic
2006-06-24 06:50 pm UTC (link)
Which externalism? There are so many different things referred to as "externalism" it's absurd. lol.

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(no subject) - [info]i_am_lane, 2006-06-24 07:22 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]synapsomatic, 2006-06-24 07:31 pm UTC

[info]synapsomatic
2006-06-24 06:52 pm UTC (link)
I would also add that the distinction between methodological and ontological are two different kinds of naturalism, but rather two different ways of being a naturalist. Under each way of being a naturalist is a list of different kinds of naturalisms.

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(no subject) - [info]i_am_lane, 2006-06-24 07:22 pm UTC

[info]jeffrock
2006-06-24 07:19 pm UTC (link)
metholodical naturalism (the methods of philosophy should be empirically responsible and in some sense contiguous with the methods of the natural sciences)

Really? I've always thought of m-naturalism as a constraint on science, not philosophy. To be honest, the whole idea of "the methods of philosophy being contiguous with the methods of natural science" seems to me to be a bit...loony.

One may be an m-naturalist without being an o-naturalist.

Sure, but this is a little misleading, as being an m-naturalist decidedly limits one to dealing with/experiencing what would only be available within an o-naturalist framework. A more accurate statement would be to claim that m-naturalists have taken o-naturalism as a working hypothesis.

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(no subject) - [info]i_am_lane, 2006-06-24 07:23 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]jeffrock, 2006-06-24 11:55 pm UTC

[info]jeffrock
2006-06-24 06:56 pm UTC (link)
There are two major types of naturalism that get talked about-- metaphysical and methodological. As the name implies metaphysical naturalism concerns itself with what exists, and as one might expect the metaphysical naturalist is going to say that "everything that exists is natural". This doesn't really answer the question though as an understanding of what this means hinges upon exactly what is meant by the term "natural". Since most people in the modern period basically associate "nature" (which is, of course, where the term natural comes from) with the material world metaphysical naturalism, in its current conception, becomes more or less equivalent to materialism. The most notable tenet of naturalism is its (tautological) denial of the existence of the "supernatural", or anything which exists over and above the natural. The most immediate corollary of such a view is the denial of the existence of an intelligence such as God that exists beyond and (designs, gives structure to, interferes with) the material world.

Methodological naturalism, on the other hand, while making no claims about the existence/nonexistence of supernatural beings such as God, instead is founded upon the weaker claim that the universe is causally closed, ie. that all phenomena that happen within the natural/material universe can be causally accounted for without ever having to invoke anything beyond it. It is claimed by many that methodological naturalism is a necessary feature of the scientific method, however there are others still who maintain that this is a valid topic of debate. Alvin Plantinga once made the following interesting remark:

"What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing science in accord with methodological naturalism? There is a good deal to be said on both sides here. For example, if you exclude the supernatural from science, then if the world or some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused — as most of the world’s people believe — you won’t be able to reach that truth scientifically.

Observing methodological naturalism thus hamstrings science by precluding science from reaching what would be an enormously important truth about the world. It might be that, just as a result of this constraint, even the best science in the long run will wind up with false conclusions."

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[info]amplimax
2006-06-24 08:47 pm UTC (link)
Observing methodological naturalism thus hamstrings science

It only hamstrings science if, as most of the world's people believe, there are phenomena within it which are supernaturally caused. But do we know this is actually the case? Just because "most of the world" believes it, is it necessarily true? Could they be wrong? Are we necessary missing any of these "enormously important truths" about the world, or is there just nothing there?

To answer that, either positively or negatively,you have to go right back to the question you started with: what type of methods do we use to justify our beliefs? And then you have to ask yourself: alright, well, what do we have access to, what can we investigate. Until someone shows us how to investigate supernatural agents, we have no reason to believe we're missing out on anything at all. Just wishful thinking.

By allowing supernatural explanations into science, we justify their existence by presupposing their existence in the first place. It might be that, just as a result of this non-constraint, even the best science in the long run will wind up with false conclusions.

Take ID for example.

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[info]erislover
2006-06-24 11:51 pm UTC (link)
It only hamstrings science if, as most of the world's people believe, there are phenomena within it which are supernaturally caused.

Really? Suppose we said that science only concerns itself with that which is amendable to natural investigation, namely, the scientific method. This is not "hamstringing science," to my view. It does not deny supernatural causes. It might raise the question, "How would we know something was supernaturally caused?" I don't think, "science has not accounted for such-and-such a phenomenon" is an appropriate answer (as far as I can tell it rests on a logical fallacy). So besides science not concerning itself with the supernatural, it can also raise skepticism of the supernatural by implicitly asking detractors for a "supernatural methodology," so to speak. Many of these have been proposed over the years: astrology, tarot cards, geomancy, and so on. Were we to suppose such things worked by supernatural means it should be no surprise that they would fail scientific tests. But of course, in failing scientific tests, we might also question their efficacy in general.

The challenge for, ah, supernaturalists lies in presenting something that is effective yet immune to scientific investigation. The efficacy of science is manifest is modern society. The efficacy of the supernatural has been going by the wayside for much of modern history. This says, to me, that science is not held back by any presupposed metaphysical answers. If anything is holding us back, it is a stubborn belief in the supernatural. Contrary to some conspiracy-like thoughts people have, I doubt anyone would be particularly upset of the supernatural were shown to exist (how this would be done is a question that has an answer I am particularly eager to hear). I also doubt it would do anything to the practice of science. What do you think?

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(no subject) - [info]amplimax, 2006-06-25 01:40 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]erislover, 2006-06-25 04:42 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]amplimax, 2006-06-25 06:03 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]jeffrock, 2006-06-25 07:58 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]epictetus_rex, 2006-06-25 05:32 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]amplimax, 2006-06-25 06:14 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]redslime, 2006-06-25 07:03 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]amplimax, 2006-06-25 09:38 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]amplimax, 2006-06-25 01:59 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]anosognosia, 2006-06-25 07:29 am UTC

[info]jeffrock
2006-06-24 11:53 pm UTC (link)
Just because "most of the world" believes it, is it necessarily true?

No, but neither are we safe in concluding that it's necessarily false just because certain people refuse to even consider it as a possibility. The point you seem to be missing is that allowing supernatural explanations as a possiblity is not the same as "presupposing" the existence of the supernatural. All we're really admitting is that we don't really know, but are at least willing to consider the possibility. Adopting this stance one does not run the risk of missing out on potential truths, as is possible with the unnecessary constraint of methodological naturalism.

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(no subject) - [info]amplimax, 2006-06-25 01:26 am UTC

[info]anosognosia
2006-06-25 03:36 am UTC (link)
"For example, if you exclude the supernatural from science, then if the world or some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused — as most of the world’s people believe — you won’t be able to reach that truth scientifically"

This doesn't appear to make any sense. It seems that whatever science can talk about is understood as natural. It certainly follows from this premise that science can only talk about the natural, but this is hardly a conclusion of interest. Is there any meaningful sense for this term 'supernatural' such that something meaningful could possibly be excluded from science under its rubric?

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[info]epictetus_rex
2006-06-25 04:02 am UTC (link)
That is precisely what I'm wondering.

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(no subject) - [info]anosognosia, 2006-06-25 05:34 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]epictetus_rex, 2006-06-25 05:45 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]anosognosia, 2006-06-25 07:13 am UTC

[info]cabrutus
2006-06-24 07:30 pm UTC (link)
There are two flavors of naturalism that don't explicitly come out in the above discussion: ethical naturalism and epistemological naturalism. Both are crazy viewpoints and utterly hopeless.

The ethical naturalist believes something like this: ethical properties (permissibility, goodness, etc.) are somehow synonymous with descriptive properties (helps the survival of the species, maximizes some brain state's occurrence) or are coextensive with such descriptive properties. Moore's "Open Question" argument completely sank the former view, and the latter view also suffers fatal problems.

The epistemological naturalist believes something like this: epistemology as it is traditionally practiced could learn a lot, perhaps everything, from the sciences of, e.g., cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, and so on, and perhaps also that epistemological properties such as epistemic justification are synonymous or coextensive with descriptive properties such as e.g. whether the structure used to form the belief was functioning the way it evolved to function, or something similar. But of course the fundamental normativity of epistemology drops out, and, as Jaegwon Kim suggested, we might as well be doing ornithology instead for all the good descriptive science does in telling us whether our beliefs are justified, what knowledge is, etc.

Philosophy is largely--perhaps almost completely--centered on normative inquiries. We want to know how we ought to behave, what we ought to believe, what we ought to value or find beautiful, etc. No scientist will ever observe a normative property in a microscope, pace the naturalists or what the naturalist must ultimately commit herself to.

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[info]sisyphus
2006-06-24 07:43 pm UTC (link)
"No scientist will ever observe a normative property in a microscope"

Right, because they don't exist. Science will likely find everything that does exist and is capable of being found by us though.

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[info]jeffrock
2006-06-24 11:28 pm UTC (link)
Science will likely find everything that does exist and is capable of being found by us though.

Not as long as it's married to metaphysical naturalism it won't.

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[info]cabrutus
2006-06-25 02:05 am UTC (link)
Do you think we ought to trust science?

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(no subject) - [info]sisyphus, 2006-06-25 04:08 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-25 05:39 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]sisyphus, 2006-06-25 07:31 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-25 09:09 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]sisyphus, 2006-06-25 10:01 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-26 04:25 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]sisyphus, 2006-06-26 08:51 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-26 01:59 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]sisyphus, 2006-06-26 04:32 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]improvedhuman, 2006-06-25 04:11 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-25 05:38 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]improvedhuman, 2006-06-25 06:20 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-25 06:32 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]epictetus_rex, 2006-06-25 06:36 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-25 06:42 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]improvedhuman, 2006-06-25 07:04 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-25 07:14 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]improvedhuman, 2006-06-25 07:52 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-25 09:07 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]improvedhuman, 2006-06-26 01:52 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-26 01:57 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]improvedhuman, 2006-06-26 08:51 pm UTC
(no subject) - [info]cabrutus, 2006-06-27 02:16 am UTC
(no subject) - [info]improvedhuman, 2006-06-28 12:05 am UTC

[info]sisyphus
2006-06-24 07:40 pm UTC (link)
Why is it not a rational goal? In terms of any kind of theory of truth, the whole course of history has been a continual discrediting of people like astrologers and mystics -- from everything we've seen the claims they make do not correspond to the world, do not 'work', are not reliable, etc.. So, I think it's rational to hold to something that excludes explanatory schemes that have never adequately explained anything.

Naturalism seems to me to just be saying, in various ways, 'look, you guys can fuck around with telekinetics, or mysticism, psychic location, etc.. and we'll be over here making the very reasonable assumption that there's nothing mysterious about the universe and working from there'; taking a stand and saying, with Woody, that between the Pope and air conditioning, we're throwing in with air conditioning. This is still vulnerable to the 'problem' of induction in some way I guess, but then you're really going to get the 'who cares' objection you raised in (1). My belief that I will die if I jump off the Empire State Building probably falls prey to it too, but I'll let the Humeans jump first... If the history of thought were a betting room in Vegas, the people who always bet on a physical solution to any phenomena where it was in doubt would be the equivalent of the guy with the Bentley and a house with a stipper pole in his bedroom.


(2) Reproducability is a cornerstone of science, something that no telekinetic has been able to demonstrate. We don't 'see' gravity because it's not necessarily a thing, but a name for the behaviour of certain objects relative to each other. Like, does 'hate' not exist because we can't see 'hate' but only me stabbing someone in the neck?

As to the scientific relativist, the naturalist isn't committed to the idea that we have the right theories at this moment in time, only that if we get a right theory, it's going to come from science and not from mysticism, and if we don't, it's going to be because of our limited perceptual apparatus, or brain power, or something else that's not mysterious.

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[info]improvedhuman
2006-06-25 12:47 am UTC (link)
Well, it makes sense:
If something interacts with the natural world then the natural world interacts with it (by def. of "interacts")
If it interacts with the natural world then what allows us to call it "supernatural"? Doesn't it become a part of the natural world, then?
If the natural world interacts with it then we can study it through "the methods of science."

Really, it looks like a fancy way to state the obvious.


And yes - gravity is just as mysterious as telekinesis. I'm sure physicists would love to study telekinesis, but alas, we are yet to find such talanted individuals who can demonstrate their ability to move objects with their mind as well as gravity has demonstrated its.
If telekinesis exists, how can it be supernatural?

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[info]homestarmy42
2006-06-25 03:15 pm UTC (link)
The idea is that nothing is "supernatural," that if something exists, it's natural, even if it's causes are not yet known. In a way, it is all about semantics, what we call that floating rock, to use your example.

Sure a non-naturalist can say telekiniesis is the cause, but the naturalist POV would discount that claim because no one has found scientific support for telekiniesis, while there is ample evidence for the effects and properties of gravity. It's simply being a realist about explaining things, using Occam's Razor and the like. It doesn't exclude astrology or mysticism, it just holds that scientific support should accompany any explanation.

Has anyone ever "seen" gravity? Is it publicly observable? How is gravity any less mysterious than telekinesis?

Drop a ball. There's public observation for you. Now give that ball to as many people as possible and see if any of them can prevent it from falling using only their thoughts, their mind. Thought so.

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[info]jadite
2006-06-25 06:15 pm UTC (link)
I didn't even read what you wrote. I just wanted to comment on your icon.... The most awesome one I've seen ever!... so far.

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[info]catachrestic
2006-06-25 07:01 pm UTC (link)
Regarding discussions on naturalism, you'll run into three types of people. (1) The reasonable type which breaks down and deconstructs the meaning of the label. I think this is what you and [info]anosognosia are basically doing. Then there are those (2) who will defend naturalism to the bone. Then there are (3), who agree that naturalism is an indefensible position (because it is limited to the descriptive), but whom think still that 'philosophy' has some special access to what really matters (the normative). So they use the discussion just for the purpose of bashing science and the priority of the scientific method, only to resurrect some other dogma that 'philosophy' somehow will reveal what is truly 'just', 'right', 'beautiful', or 'truth', or whatever.

(2) and (3) are both indefensible. But sometimes the (1)'s are confused for the (3)'s because they are both questioning the comprehensibility of naturalism. Don't confuse them. The (3)'s are as bad as the (2)'s.

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