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12/5/09 06:53 pm
I've posted this on philo_major, but it couldn't hurt to get other opinions! Currently, I am in the health administration industry and I make large amounts of money. I'm a year away from getting my health administration degree, which I would make even more money with. Eventually, my goal is to get a ph.d in philosophy..but for now... I do extensive reading outside of class, and I've taken quite a few philosophy courses. While I don't take formal education in philosophy too seriously, I'd still enjoy the classes. I'm not too keen on getting my philosophy bachelors from this school though, but I could get my minor. The money for me was never an issue, but I honestly support my whole family, including the extended family that have it pretty bad. I would start on my goal right away, but I would first like to make some money. This is my plan- and you guys are welcome to destroy it to pieces! I will finish my health administration degree with a minor in philosophy. I would then prepare for a masters program, while working..I'm sure that at that point I would be able to support myself without working too much. I'm sure this sounds like a good idea in my head- but what do you guys think?
12/3/09 01:05 am
Researchers at Princeton University suggest* that consciousness (the mind) can influence the behavior of physical devices known as random event generators. Maybe some of you have heard about the Mind Lamp - http://www.mind-lamp.com/mind-lamp-research.php - or even have one. Now there's an LJ community to discuss your experience and thoughts, and to create a software implementation: http://community.livejournal.com/mindlamp
Other software and hardware instruments for the mind-matter interaction research are also welcome. Those who enjoy computer programming are especially welcome!
--- *Just in case, more details are at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem etc.
11/30/09 03:52 pm
This is probably not the ideal place to get an answer to this question, but I've looked around and asked a lot of other people, and thought I might as well ask for opinions here.
What are some good graduate programs in continental philosophy? I am specifically looking for departments that are all continental or primarily continental. I'm already looking at SUNY Stony Brook, Memphis, NSSR, etc.
And yes, I've seen the epic list of Philosophy Graduate Schools Friendly to Continental Philosophy, but just thought I would fish for a little more information. Has anyone out there attended graduate school for continental philosophy, and, if so, do you have any advice.
Crossposted to Philosophy, Real_Philosophy
11/25/09 05:44 pm
A quick question for early medieval philosophy specialists: is Boethius' veiw of evil more-or-less the same as Augustine's?
11/13/09 04:05 pm
Hume makes the following famous argument in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:
- When we experience the constant conjunction of one object (Object A) followed by another (Object B), we begin to feel that there is a causal connection there. This is why we think we know about causal connections in the world.
- What accounts for this feeling is the habit of the imagination whereby it follows the idea of Object A with the idea of Object B whenever we think about it. This is because we've been exposed to this relationship between Object A and Object B so many times before.
- This process is not sufficient to justify knowledge of the relationship between cause and effect between Object A and Object B, because mere constant conjunction is never enough to justify the law of induction necessary to derive a claim about causality
- So much for knowledge of cause and effect!
There's a problem with this argument. The problem is that step (2) is wrong. Seriously, do any of you have the experience Hume described? I go into an elevator and push a button, expecting it to take me to another floor. I don't expect this because I suddenly imagine that I'm on the 12th floor as my finger approaches the button. I do feel (these are Hume's italics, by the way) that there is a cause and effect relation here, but that feeling is nothing like what Hume describes. If this is true, then what prevents us from taking the feeling of a causal connection as a kind of perception that itself justifies causal knowledge? That's what we do, prima facie, with other sensations we have. That solves the whole problem of skepticism about causality and it doesn't even require a transcendental argument! BONUS ARGUMENTStep (2) is also bad news because it is itself a causal explanation inferred from the constant conjunction of constantly conjoined objects and the feeling of a causal connection. By the conclusion of the argument, it is impossible to justify this step.
11/10/09 10:55 am
In On Interpretation, chapter 7, Aristotle lays out two types of subjects which can be combined with a predicate to form a proposition: Individuals ("Socrates") and universals ("man"). Propositions with universal subjects can be further split into those of a universal character ("Every man is white") and those not of a universal character ("Man is white").
I have taken "universal subjects of a non-universal character" to refer to the group itself ("man"), as contrasted with a reference to each individual ("every man"), or one individual ("Socrates"). In this sense, Aristotle's statement that "man is white" and "man is not white" are not contrary is sensible, in the sense that there are both white and non-white elements of the group "man." However, other problems arise if this definition is used.
Again, in chapter 7, Aristotle states:
"...the proposition 'man is not white' appears to be equivalent to the proposition 'no man is white'. This, however, is not the case, nor are they necessarily at the same time true or false."
Does this not ruin my definition? If "man is white" means "the group of things that we call 'man' contain within them at least one thing that is properly called white," then surely "man is not white" is equivalent to "no man is white." In what case could they not be both true or both false?
Clearly my understanding of universals not of a universal character is wrong, which is unfortunate, because Aristotle spends a great deal of time on them later on. But then I am confounded by the following statement, in the same chapter, which seems to support my definition:
"...it is possible to state truly that man is white and that man is not white and that man is beautiful and that man is not beautiful; for if a man is deformed he is the reverse of beautiful, also if he is progressing towards beauty he is not yet beautiful."
Finally, is there a better term for these? My translation uses the term "distributed" once in regard to propositions with a universal subject of a universal character. Might I then say "non-distributed universals?" I'd like to avoid inserting modern terminology into my reading of Aristotle, especially since distribution has a very specific meaning in set theory, but he can be a wordy, awkward little bastard.
11/8/09 08:01 pm
This isn't exactly an orthodox question for this group, but I figured that if anyone had the answer to it that it would be you guys, so I will ask it.
The question is this: is a degree in Philosophy worth getting? Additional questions: what types of jobs could one get with a graduate degree in Philosophy? If you have an M.A. in another field, could you in theory skip the B.A. in Philosophy and get accepted into a graduate program instead?
I'm thinking about maybe going into Philosophy a couple years after I get my M.A. in May, depending on various factors.
11/8/09 12:41 pm
In his Social Contract (translated, obviously) there's a footnote which reads:
"For the will to be general, it does not always have to be unanimous; but all the votes must be counted. Any formal exclusion destroys its universality." (Book 2, ch. 2)
Now, I understand the terms, but what does it mean for a formal exclusion to destroy the universality of the general will?
11/7/09 02:14 pm
Should we aspire to a single totalizing system of knowledge (i.e., one that includes everything in it), or should/must we strive for multiple systems, irreducible to each other, with no transcendent perspective or unifying metanarrative? Discuss.
11/3/09 12:42 pm
Today's society would be one of the best and worst societies that have ever existed in history. It has demonstrated to be one of the best because of the growing number of people who are making advances with the many different technologies we have today. That same society have also demonstrated to be one of the worst as being the most ignorant and selfish group yet, wallowing in pointless materialistic luxuries, drowning in pointless, mindless information (reality shows where having people do stupid stuff is the main point), forgetting past cultures and traditions that had once made the human race so rich, and generally being unaware of the world, or even just their local surroundings.
All the flaws of this society have mounted up, and the perpetrators don't even notice it: the economic downtrun was partially because of senseless spending on things unaffordable; people not being politically ept had resulted into bad judgments of political acts and figures; and today's colloquialism and "acceptable" etiquette--with all the homophobic slurs, the use of offensive titles to label someone, and the whole "c u L8r" 's, just to name a few--has proven that this modern society is degenerate among past.
I may be harsh on this view, and am sure that there are a number of upsides, but this is the portrait of today's youth, and if no one is willing to change it, then the portrait of the future would look very bleak. Current Mood: a criticism
11/3/09 09:55 am
I've just discovered this community and it looks really great, please forgive me if my first post is not appropriate for this kind of discussion board:
The situation is thus: I am a second year literature student with a thirst for knowledge; I am loving studying literature, but have great interest in both philosophy and the old classics. Unfortunatly my university is very small has no department for either, I would really love someone -ideally a student or tutor- who I could regularly talk to about these subjects, as i feel a little lost entering them on my own. If anyone would be interested in starting a regular correspondanse please email me, Thanks very much.
10/30/09 04:51 am
I don't know if this counts as a philosophical topic/question, but I believe my troubles lately have been stemming from my floundering attempts to determine how I view life, what I believe to be the meaning of life, and the inherent nature of the human species, and I could really use some feedback. If this post isn't appropriate for the group I apologize, and understand if it is removed.
I have been contemplating the questions I mentioned above for only the past year or so. I use to be a very (outwardly) superficial person, and concerned myself with mostly tangible, material things and shallow pleasures. It wasn't until a couple years ago that I gained a respect and awe for the phenomenon of life, and began to seek a more meaningful existence. I wanted (and still do want) to be a better person. I tapped into an intelligence for the sciences that I didn't know I possessed, went back to school, and am hopefully graduating next year. This fall, I took a course on environmental ethics. The readings for the course really inspired and intrigued me, and although I've never taken a class in philosophy, I began to research the topic a bit on my own. I was mostly interested in understanding how and why people think in the ways that they do. A very general and broad topic, I know. Also, a very individualistic topic- you will never see the world the exact same way I do, and I will never see it in the exact way that you do. Our realities are uniquely our own, something I find fascinating. Anyway, the more I read and learned, the more I wanted to know and the more I questioned the purpose and meaning of my own existence and life. I also am newly interested in astronomy, and find space and time very intimidating but very interesting subjects. I don't know if it was a sudden realization of how small I as an individual am in the grand scheme of things or maybe it was the foreboding feeling that no matter what I do in my life, it will ultimately be insignificant due to my minisculiality, or maybe the realization that the culture I was raised in (I'm from America) values things that are completely petty and meaningless and shies away from encouraging critical, logical thinking, and is raising generations of "sheeple" (sheep-like people, in case the spelling wasn't clear). I don't know what it was. But I have reached a point where I cannot make myself care about anything. I am overwhelmed by apathy. I am normally overly-sensitive and empathetic, if anything, and this switch has really thrown me off. I know I don't like the way I feel, but I cannot seem to change it. Those things that once brought me joy (reading, learning, hiking, playing world of warcraft, cooking) simply do nothing for me now. Nothing in life brings me joy. Now, I don't feel overly depressed or emotionally out of control- I'm certainly not suicidal or entertaining thoughts of hurting myself. It's more like a deep resolve has settled over me, and I truly belive that nothing in my life, nothing that I do or say or stand for really matters. I want to be motivated and inspired again, I want to feel the joy I once felt in just existing. So after this very long-winded post (I do apologize) I guess my question is this: How does one overcome apathy? How do I make myself care again?
Thank you for any feedback, it's very much appreciated.
10/29/09 10:20 am
In following the historical approach espoused by the inner circle of this community, I find myself getting distracted by questions of method, especially outside of the context of a university. Should my studies emulate a college course, perhaps utilizing resources such as MIT's OpenCourseWare? Should I seek assigned readings and essay prompts offered by experts, do them, and find a critical audience?
This seems stale. Isn't the primary pleasure of self-education the avoidance of the insipid rigmarole of coursework designed for mass consumption? The ability to follow the trails of interest wherever they lead, efficiency be damned?
My ideal is a deadly-serious discussion group (something like seminars at St John's), but I have never made any headway in this. Most post-collegiates tend to hate serious study, and the works of long-dead metaphysicians seem to be of interest only to men, of which I know few. It's a problem.
So I default to reading, taking notes, and furrowing my brow. I have rarely in the past been moved to post here -- I feel silly doing so, as if there is more gravitas expected of posts than I can offer -- so I feel like I have no outlet. My notes stay in my notebook, and I am unsure how to proceed.
I'm enjoying this pursuit, otherwise I would not do it, but I get the sense that it could be far more fruitful.
So, what is your method of study? With what questions do you frame the study of texts? What is the product of your labors when none are required of you?
10/28/09 12:37 pm
Hello, I wanted some input on Bertrand Russell. His essay on the value of philosophy says that studying philosophy helps to broaden minds. To have beliefs challenged is to be a wiser person, but this requires looking at another viewpoint...
What does Russell mean here:
"The true philosophic contemplation, on the contrary, finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated, and thereby the subject contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that is personal or private, everything that depends upon habit, self-interest, or desire, distorts the object, and hence impairs the union which the intellect seeks."
What is the "enlargement of the Self"? What happens to the common man that does not seek to study philosophy? Thanks.
10/22/09 10:04 pm
Hello this is pmax3, member of this community but using a different username for some reasons (have temporarily locked that account). I am urgently in need of help from you fine folks. Can you please direct me towards some literature about the philosophy of ethics which is rich and interesting while at the same time concise and understandable for one not very familier with the topic?
This is an emergency, and i need the info relatively quickly (plus i'll need time to study and understand too). I will express my gratitude in any which way you ask me to if you help me out here.
Thanks a lot, benevolent wise people.
10/21/09 05:49 pm
I suppose it's reasonable enough an assumption that a doctor in her life does more good than a pianist who is as good a pianist as the doctor is a doctor. If you like, you can find the doctor a post with the MSF and have her specialise in some obscure but hugely important branch of medicine; and you can make the pianist specialise in twenty-first-century music.
This being so, when I am faced with a choice between joining her in that noble profession and spending eight hours a day playing scales, I am as a Utilitarian bound to the opt for the former. The problem with this, of course, is that everyone faces the same choice, and is bound to the same conclusion; but a world without pianists would be a truly ugly place. I could not live in such a world; and I would query the use of doctors very deeply.
The way out seems very simple, but I can't see it being made in a Utilitarian framework. The way out is to do that for which my heart and reason together strive hardest: if I am heart a pianist, then I should try to become one; others will be doctors.
But the world needs more doctors, and this need is more urgent than the need for concert pianists. My own personal choice here has nothing to do with what other people do: it concerns only what I can do to make the world as best as I can. I can only justifiably devote myself to my piano if there is a real possibility that there is or soon will be an oversupply of doctors, or a severe paucity of pianists.
Let me restate this (slightly more strongly) for fear of opacity in the above: A person can do one of two things, A and B; A is more valuable, and always will be, but we need both A and B for our world to be one in which our lives can be worthwhile. There is never any case in which a person can legitimately choose B over A, and never any case in which B is the option with the most value, e.g., never any case when A is impossible for, say, geographical reasons.
This seems a very elementary objection: but I can't see any response the Utilitarian could make other than the one I've given.
10/19/09 06:38 pm
I'm bemused by the kind of mind that can admit the existence of the "fallacy fallacy" without beginning to suspect that the whole project of identifying and cataloguing the informal fallacies is just a bit fishy.
Because, like most of them, there's a variant of the ad logicam that's perfectly kosher: (p -> q) is true if the truth of p guarantees the truth of q, false otherwise. If r is the proposition (p -> q), then "r iff s, and s is fallacious" does in fact mean "r is false", at least, just so long as the fallacy in s guarantees s not to be truth-preserving. ("r if s" is the proposition that the truth of the premises of s guarantees that the truth of p guarantees the truth of q, "r iff s" is the proposition that only the truth of the premises of s can guarantee that the truth of p guarantees the truth of q.)
Which means the argument ad logicam sometimes flies and sometimes doesn't depending on the nature of the fallacy. If (p -> q) iff s and s is a formal fallacy, then s is not truth-preserving, (p -> q) is not guaranteed and r is false. But if (p -> q) iff s and s is an informal fallacy — given that informal fallacies don't necessarily mean that the argument fails to preserve truth, only that it might — then s might be truth-preserving, (p -> q) might be guaranteed and r might not be false.
Any argument at all can be given as (q -> r) where r is the conclusion and q the conjunction of the premises. Label (q -> r) as p and it's clear that any p not simply assumed as an axiom can be shown false with an ad logicam argument against its formally fallacious parts.
But deployed against informal fallacies, the "fallacy fallacy" is always a fallacy.
People miss this because they're busy mistaking the ad logicam fallacy for a species of the Bad Reasons fallacy and following this mistake to the incorrect conclusion that argument is not a zero-sum game. But conclusive argument is a zero-sum game — either p is true or p is false, or the argument is inconclusive.
Moreover, there is such a thing as the "fallacy fallacy". And every claim of "your argument is wrong because it contains an informal fallacy" is an instance of it.
10/17/09 11:47 pm
1. Black face (in nearly all instances) is offensive because it involves a privileged group of people impersonating a lesser privileged group of people, and bringing ridicule to the second group through the impersonation. The 'joke' in blackface is 'Har, har. They're dressed like black people.'
2. In a recent interview, Germaine Greer mentioned that there was a history of cross-dressing as a form of humour: usually a guy depicting a ridiculous and absurd old woman. I admit that I found instances of it amusing. Take the following example of Tim Brooke-Taylor and John Cleese:
Greer finds this sort of humour offensive because it involves a privileged group of people impersonating a lesser privileged group of people, and bringing ridicule to the second group through the impersonation. Here, the joke seems to be the ridiculousness of the character, so on reflexion, I can't help but wonder why they needed to send up old women (except that, the comedy of the time was antifeminist).
3. The Trans community often seeks what they call 'legitimacy'. The argument is made that, as gender is a social construct, individuals can choose to engage in that construct as active participants rather than as passive objects. Thus, a man can choose to engage the construct as a female. Instead of being viewed as a 'pretend' woman, many trans-women wish to be viewed as women.
Race is also a social construct yet we do not think that individuals can choose to engage in that construct as active participants (in general). A white male, for example, cannot choose to live as a person of colour.
As I'm not a part of the Trans community, I lack the understanding from within the culture, but I do not see the creation of a new gender (or of new genders) as illegitimate (the new genders being trans-man and trans-woman). As a male is not socialised as a woman, the male can never be legitimately a woman (but that is not necessarily a negative attribute).
We can also identify the Trans community as a particular social group of its own: the Trans community are likely to experience prejudice distinct from the prejudice experienced by women, &c.
Transvestitism is used as a form of entertainment on the fringe of the Trans community. Priscilla, Queen of the Desert provides a fictional account of this form of entertainment. But at the heart of the entertainment is the message: 'This is entertaining because it is a man dressed as a woman.' It wouldn't be entertaining if a guy were performing the same act without the drag.
I can't help but feel that drag shows are inappropriate due to the power relations involved. A privileged group of people (men) are impersonating a lesser privileged group of people (women) for cheap entertainment. If, on the other hand, members of the Trans community are of a distinct, socially-constructed gender (or genders), then we don't have a problem: the drag shows are just a celebration of the gender. While individual motives might be different, the overall construct is no longer morally dubious.
So, which is it? Are Trans-women a privileged group of people appropriating the attributes of a lesser privileged group of people, making drag shows distasteful and morally questionable? Or are the Trans-identities a distinct gender (or genders) and, thus, there is no appropriation?
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