Continental Philosophy
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Below are the 18 most recent journal entries recorded in
Continental Philosophy's LiveJournal:
| Tuesday, April 15th, 2008 | 12:35 am
[criticalhit]
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Resources for Heidegger's vocabulary.
Hey, I'm taking a class in Heidegger right now and we're pretty much going through the entirety of Heidegger's book. I am accustomed to becoming very familiar with a philosopher's vocab and then reading the book a second time through to better understand their meanings. Does anyone have a good site or guide they could share with me that has Heidegger's terms laid out fairly explicitly (aside from stanford's encycopedia)? Thanks.
DP | | Thursday, March 13th, 2008 | 11:02 pm
[bluezoe4]
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Jean-Luc Marion Hi everybody! I'm not sure if this is the proper place to ask this question but here goes. I've been doing my research on Jean-Luc Marion. As far as I understand him, he believes that Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology is not phenomenological enough. This makes him jump to a third reduction: back to the givenness of the things themselves. Instead of focusing on the objectness of objects (Husserl) and Dasein (Heidegger), Marion goes back to the very givenness of the givens as they are given to us. Insofar as these givens are given, they attest to phenomenality. In this sense, phenomenality and givenness amount to the same thing. He proceeds with his reduction of the self, and comes up with l'interloque which he developed in his book Reduction and Givenness. In his two succeeding books in his phenomenological triptych Being Given and In Excess, he continues this thinking and comes up with l'attributaire, l'adonne, and finally, l'amant. We are thus witnesses to phenomenon. His phenomenology eventually amounts to a philosophy that has its apex in love. We are thus loved. Knowing that we are loved, we are called to love in return (though not as simple as this formulation). To me, everything up to here is clear. But, with situations such as tragedies, natural (Katrina) or otherwise (Mogadishu, Rwanda), I feel that he is keeping silent about issues on senseless violence. What can his philosophy of givenness say about these? Can anybody suggest readings that might answer this? If you have files (or even links) that you can send me, that would be of great help, too. Thanks a lot! | | Saturday, June 23rd, 2007 | 2:34 pm
[roganov_serge]
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modern_marxism http://community.livejournal.com/modern_marxism/profile for those who are interested in studying of Marx&Engels heritage, modern interpretations as well as schools and thinkers of XX century. Posts in any language are welcome! Tell post-Soviet space about your work, your club, your thoughts! Thank you for attention! | | Sunday, June 17th, 2007 | 7:33 pm
[roganov_serge]
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Fedor Dostoevsky and modern bioethical challenge (text of my lection at the GWU and Tuebingen) ....We are reluctantly aging, although one may not separate aging and the event of death – perhaps the meaning of human death is inseparable from the meaning of aging. Who can not die, never can be born. Questioning the meaning of death one should question the meaning of aging. Certainly, it is absolutely impossible to understand social interaction between old and young generations without an understanding of the necessity of human death. Yes, necessity – the threat of modern consciousness.... So, death is an eventual event of the human being’s becoming, so the processes of aging, dying, death itself are intrinsic processes of a man. They could not be eliminated in some or other way. So, self-death is a necessary final process of human life which first begins with signs of aging. And only as a self-death does human death gain its meaning. Surely, I do not mean by self death some kind of suicide. In no way, - I want to emphasize this once more, as if Kirillov felt himself our doubts and added: “Now I am only a god against my will and I am unhappy, because I am bound to assert my will”. But he was sure, that “If you recognize it (self-death – S.R.) you are sovereign, and then you won't kill yourself but will live in the greatest glory.” And then Kirillov added most important words for us: “I will begin and will make an end of it and open the door, and will save. That's the only thing that will save mankind and will re-create the next generation physically; for with his present physical nature man can't get on without his former God, I believe”. Here arises the main idea of terrible logic – the idea of the human limit without God, a limit which abhors all extremes. This is the hidden fundamental idea of “logical suicide”. http://www.litsovet.ru/index.php/material.read?material_id=133415 | | Monday, May 14th, 2007 | 5:02 pm
[anfalicious]
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Bad Faith
OK, I'm trying to get a handle on Sartre's idea of bad faith. It all seems very simple, either denying our facticity, denying our freedom, or failing to reconcile our facticity with our freedom. But when I read chapter two of Being and Nothingness, Sartre seems to decide to be completely inconsistent with his uses of the term, and hide it behind a convolution of words.
What I am talking about is this: In the date example, he believes the woman who leaves her hand is in bad faith. He mentions that she is aware she is an object of desire, that she realises herself as not being her body, but that she is not aware she has left her hand. I'm a little unsure how you can criticise Freud's censor between the id and the ego, yet expect me to believe that the woman can distract herself in this way.
Secondly, Sartre seems to think that leaving her hand there is not a genuine option. Why not? Why does she have to accept or deny the mans advances? Why can't she just keep leading him on without an end? Yes it would piss the man off (I'm thinking this is possibly based on a time that Sartre himself was rejected, but we'll keep away from ad homonems at the moment), but why is it not a genuine choice to do this? Sartre mentions that if we make a choice and then later on rationalise it, we are in bad faith. So is there any way for this woman to not be in bad faith once this man has forced a decision on her?
On that point, is it even possible to be in good faith? I haven't read Existentialism is a Humanism, where I believe this point is expounded, but how does Sartre reconcile the project of self-recovery without sincerity? How can one recover oneself without being sincere to oneself? And if we can't, then how do we escape the fact that bad faith comes out of sincerity?
This is my first showing to Sartre, and I must say, I'm not at all impressed. Whilst being somewhat clearer to read than Heidegger, he is annoyingly vague and inconsistent, and I'm yet to actually get any solid concepts from him that aren't said a thousand times better by Heidegger.
Xposted in Philosophy | | Wednesday, May 9th, 2007 | 12:24 am
[mychimaera]
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This community seems deader than God considering that no one has made an update in the past year. Does anyone know of any other contential/post-modern orientated philosophy communities that are active?
...And if not, is there anyone who would like to start a fresh one since the moderater of this community is gone? I was thinking about it myself but I'm not sure if I'm completely qualified or have the time on hand. | | Monday, May 1st, 2006 | 5:09 pm
[guralyuk_en] |
Belarus: "The last dictatorship of Europe"? Chernobyl socium? Postsoviet museum? Future of Russia? Review of my book  Review of the book United Nation: The Phenomenon of Belarus by Yury Shevtsov, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2006, ( Read more... ) | | Wednesday, April 26th, 2006 | 6:12 pm
[mrbubs]
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So a professor of mine just contended that Walter Benjamin would think of photography now as being artistic in terms of having aura. She stated that photography has changed so much that it's hard to not treat photography as Art.
What do you guys think? I personally think that's a crock of shit, because Benjamin would only contend that photography would have aura if presented in a structure much akin to how paintings are stored and exhibited to create the modern Aura. The previous understanding of modern art having aura because of the extension to man's labor blurring the presence of politics in art seems outdated, as now all of art is enamored in political contexts (or still being political when decontextualized). The shift from marxist discourse of material explanation to a construction of cultural logic & discourse is primarily dependent on the Frankfurt School, and it would not seem inplausible for Benjamin to make a similar jump, though maybe not as dramatic. | | Tuesday, February 28th, 2006 | 8:22 pm
[mrbubs]
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sooooooo
how dead is this community?
Because it looks pretty sweet.
I love me some poststructuralism. | | Saturday, October 22nd, 2005 | 11:30 pm
[goshoraku] |
dear philosophers on behalf of the Fearless Faux Colonial Marine Corps i must announce that after 2000 years of fun and games philosophy is over. return to your homes and families and do something productive with your lives. stop taking these dumb arguements seriously do something productive. you'll enjoy it trust me.  i am glad someone has finally woken up to this fact and is willing to speak up about it. we give our Faux brothers credit for this and for finally exposing philosophy debate for the joke that it is. banning people and censorship isn't the answer. the war may be over but the Imperial Colonies of Faux are still recruiting as before. join us and you will be one step closer to not being a philosophy geek anymore. we're hear to help!  FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX FAUX | | Monday, September 26th, 2005 | 10:45 pm
[nanikore]
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Attention all civilians and non-civilians =Begin Transmission= As most of you know, this forum has been nuked. The nuclear attack happened when nobody noticed. (actually, there is no nuke... but it sounds better than "this forum has been abandoned by its former mod." Besides, the scenery is the same anyways) To compensate for the loss of the former 4th imperial colony of the Banana Empire of Faux to independence, another mostly-dead-save-for-a-few-squirrels realm has been nonrandomly selected to be taken over for the sole purpose of flying the 4th colonial flag ( because a good flag is such a terrible thing to waste) A ceremony will be held when the sun reaches the 42nd degree from the horizon. The imperial national anthem will be blasted over loudspeakers, along with a 42 spitball & methane cannon salute.
Pledge Allegiance To The Flag Of Your Imperial Colony
Evacuation of refugees to the realm of ![[info]](http://p-stat.livejournal.com/img/community.gif) sublimethinking (which is doing a slightly better job at staying above the level of dead, presently at Condition Zombie) will be provided FREE OF CHARGE, meaning there will be NO tolls collected at the 3279 toll booths established on the roads (now toll roads) across this colony. Sorry, no vehicles or footwear provided. There is also a curfew from 6am to 6am the next day. Violators shall be flogged. Have a nice day. =End Transmission= | | Thursday, August 11th, 2005 | 4:15 am
[thescuspeaks]
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Italian feminist theorists
*Sorry for the absurd x-posting*
Does anyone here know of any italian feminist theorists (in translation or not)?
Thank you.
Current Music: Arcade Fire- Funeral | | Friday, February 4th, 2005 | 1:31 pm
[mybravestmask]
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Adorno Community Just got around to this. An open community for discussion. teddy_adorno | | Wednesday, February 2nd, 2005 | 6:15 am
[mybravestmask]
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Adornians? I'm curious. Has anyone here studied Adorno in depth or even reads him casually and would be up for some discussion? I took a grad course on his philosophy last year and I'm now in a Critical Theory seminar, but no one in my grad program (Boston College) really likes Adorno aside from me (It's a very Heideggerian department) and as such, I have no one to bounce ideas off of! my email is tepper@bc.edu. Or just comment on my journal and i'll add you on there. xposted Current Mood:  curiousCurrent Music: Muse - Fillip | | Wednesday, January 12th, 2005 | 7:12 pm
[nanikore]
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postphenomenology I found this paper on the intraweb: http://imv.au.dk/sts/arbejdspapirer/WP3.pdfThe reason I found it is because- 1. Wittgenstein, one of my (anti)heroes, supposedly have a heavy influence over the emerging "postanalytic school" of philosophy. I don't even know what "postanalytic" is supposed to be because I couldn't find one direct reference on it but I found this paper instead 2. Dewey, one of my other (anti)heroes, is mentioned in the paper 3. "Postphenomenology" is supposedly "phenomenology being practical." I just <3 practical 4. Perhaps I'll show ![[info]](http://p-stat.livejournal.com/img/userinfo.gif) i_am_lane this paper later, just to upset him (first portion of the paper is a lot of big self-congratulating talk and fluff, but you'd probably have to suffer through it to get what's he talkin' about) | | Saturday, November 6th, 2004 | 8:19 pm
[anosognosia]
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Is there any interest in psychoanalysis among people here? | 2:30 pm
[warmdaddy]
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This question may be a little basic for this community, but it is definitely to do with continental philosophy. I was just wondering if anyone has read Being and Time (Sein and Zeit). I am plannng on doing a course on Heidegger's philosophy next semester and I have to read that book. What advice can people give me about reading it. It is not too dense is it ? | | Friday, November 5th, 2004 | 5:27 pm
[stevenchabot]
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Hello.
For this first post, a little bit of an introduction. I am currently a senior student at the University of Toronto here in Ontario, Canada, currently fighting my way into the ever so limited ranks of philosophy graduate students--continental students at that. My main interests are metaphysics, ethics and the relation to religious discourse, with most of my interest coming from phenomenology. My new favourite is Levinas, who I think says a lot of what I have been thinking for the last four years, but I will confess to being somewhat of a Kantian, or at least that's the position I tend to take in discussions.
I am currently working on a section of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Chapter III of the Analytic, where he discusses the Objective and Subjective incentives of the will. Basically, what he is saying is that for an act to be moral, the moral law must effect both aspects of the will. So, not only must he law be the objective basis, but also the subjective, or sensual, basis as well.
This seems contradictory, because a moral act must be done irregardless of sensation. However, Kant is arguing that it is the moral law itself which is has an effect on sensation, and that effect itself is a sensation. Thus, this "moral feeling" is the only sensation we can deduct a priori.
What I am attempting to do is link this in some way with Levinas. While both thinkers give primacy to ethics, Levinas would call the Kantian freedom into question, because it seems to ignore the face of the Other. He says something in "Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite" against even the freedom which is self-legislating. I'd quote it, but I don't have it handy.
What I am going to argue is that, while the objective basis is irregardless of the Other, the subjective basis opens us up to the face of the Other, as it deals with moral specifics, and moral feelings. My three points of comparison are:
1. This Kantian feeling, termed "respect" is always "respect for another". Does this mean that we have thought of the other a priori because this feeling is deduced a priori? So, while the moral law does not think of the other, the subjective effects of that law are always Other-directed.
2. This respect always shows that the Other is more moral that I, for Kant. He deserves my respect because I always think him better. Shades of Levinas saying that the Other is always "Closer to God" than I.
3. This feeling that we have, is not properly a feeling. It is an inclination that is not an inclination. Classically, all feelings have an object: the lack of that object is pain, the actualization of it is pleasure. Kant follows this model, except in this case. He specifically says that it is a feeling without an object, and is neither pleasure nor pain, or is both pleasure or pain (I haven't figured it out yet). There is a relation here to Levinas' "Desire" of the Other, which does not long for an object, "a hunger which cannot be filled because it does not call for food."
Any thoughts, anyone? |
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