A Defence of Free Will from an Objectivist Viewpoint, and a Response by me.
Posted for ninskigirl's benefit. The former was originally posted here, and both were posted almost a year ago. I don't know about the former's stance now (I haven't talked to him since, basically), but my philosophical maturity is qualitatively higher than it was a year ago, so don't necessarily attribute any of it to my current self.

Tour de Force in Defence of Volition.

Free will exists. This, the faculty of volition, is part of human consciousness, is real, possesses a specific nature, and is consistent with the law of identity.

This piece is being written so that all those concerned have the rational case for volition consistently presented to them, as opposed to the prevalence of concrete-bound argumentation. It is to cover loose ends and to stand at the center of my continued defense of the existence of volition, and I am prepared to continue to defend it against those who have read this.

I hardly need to mention my intellectual debt to Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff; consider this as including one huge citation to all of their work, with the footnote “As interpreted and applied by myself.” Hardly any of what I’m writing is strictly new ideologically, and I act as an unofficial scholar of Objectivism, although some of these integrations are mine and I officially represent only myself, who happens to be indebted to their work.

Throughout this piece, the following definitions are being used as to clarify the precise meaning of my words.
Free Will/Volition: “The faculty possessed by human consciousness allowing the possessor the possibility of more than one specific course of action.”
Determinism: “The belief that all entities, including humans, necessarily take once specific course of action, its identity allowing no alternative, i.e. that man is determined. Belief in the non-existence of free will.”
Causality/Law of Causality: “The metaphysical law, a corollary of the law of identity, which states that everything acts with and based on its identity. The fact that actions are caused.”
Mechanical Causality: “The instance of the law of causality in which every specific action taken by the objects involved necessarily took place on account of a linear causal sequence.”

Whether or not one agrees with my developed definitions is in most ways superfluous. This is what I mean, and if the definitions given distance one from the argument altogether, then we are speaking of a different subject anyway.

The following facts are to be taken for granted in this treatise: the validity of sense perception, the potential competence of human cognition, the law of identity, the validity of reason, the validity of logic, and the objective significance of the meaning of words as referents to reality. Anyone who contradicts these is contradicting himself in a very blatant way, and I am not currently taking it upon myself to validate these for those who wish to deny them. “Volition is the thing.”

This work is split into the following sections:

1. Intro (this,)
2. The Nature of Free Will and Why One Believes In It
3. Volition as Axiomatic
4. Discounting Arguments against Free Will
To Be Added Later: Conclusion and Consequences of the Issue

The Nature of Free Will and Why One Believes In It

Before arguments against free will can be sufficiently discounted, it must be stated why one is to believe in it in the first place. It is necessary to establish the syllogism or observation that one is defending.

Free will is self-evident to each of us the moment one begins to think. It can be observed directly, via introspection, or implicitly by the act of thought. When one makes decisions, one observes that more than a single method of cognitive (and therefore existential) action is possible. Decision-making and conceptual cognition itself rests on this premise. A thinking human is consistently aware of separate conclusions and actions, which, by his nature, he could draw, but with reason (or a lack of it) do not; note that on the cognitive level, thought is action.

Lacking free will would leave us bound to the perceptual, animal level of consciousness: infallible and limited. We would lack true thought, and our perception would lack the possibility of actual conclusions, which, by their nature, are conditional. As one proceeds to the conceptual level, one simultaneously observes the existence of volition.

One can then proceed to establish that this observation is consistent with our knowledge of other human, conceptual-level minds. While animals (not always successfully,) consistently act towards self-preservation in their own limited, mechanical way, humans have the potential to choose to think or not to think, to focus or to evade, to pursue life or to pursue a form of self-destruction. This can be seen in the existence of irrationality, of suicide, of drug abuse, as well as in the ability of the mind to focus, to discover electricity, to invent the combustion engine, or to write Atlas Shrugged. And, most of all, this is displayed in a specific mind’s potential to pursue either direction. All of this supplements one’s own introspective observation of free will.

When looked at honestly and objectively and not from the position of Ivory Tower daydreamers, free will is neither a mystic fantasy nor a matter of random chance. We each both perceive and accept it implicitly as a very real faculty of our cognition.

While most of our thoughts and actions operate within mechanical causality, the basic decision on the nature of our mental motive power, i.e. “to focus or not to focus,” does not; multiple alternatives are open. And this is what makes it ‘free will,’ i.e. causes our specific actions not to be necessitated by our past nature.

This, we observe in our decision-making and accept implicitly, is the nature of volition. And to deny it, is to indulge in a contradiction.

Volition as Axiomatic

Humans, the only possessors of conceptual cognition on Earth, do not merely perceive individual objects. While we do posses this automatic, perceptual level of consciousness, we can build from it unto a higher level, which is dependant on it. This, the conceptual level, is not automatic. Think about your sight and you will realize you need to initiate no action in order for it to work. Think about your sight, and realize that thought requires conditional, self-initiated action. The volitional is the conceptual. The concepts we form, which allow us to categorize concretes and act on long-range essentials, depend on choice.

Concrete perception (or lower) cannot be wrong. Whatever senses a consciousness possesses, be they eyes, or color-blind eyes (such as mine,) or the pure pre-perceptual sensations of certain sea creatures, there is no basis on which to consider them invalid. Some means of perception, such as my own, might but be slightly (or others much) less efficient in some way and thus less profitable for life than they would be if they were not deficient, but the knowledge gained by these means is not “invalid” in the sense of not corresponding with existence, in the way that someone’s conclusion might not. All pre-conceptual cognitive tools mechanically respond to the specific identity of external reality, in a form necessitate by their nature, and are used by the possessor to consider whatever part of external existence it experiences by whatever means it happens to have. This level of perception is not, and can never be, “right or wrong,” but “its own specific means,” and cannot be properly doubted; it had to be that way, so there is no basis for criticism.

The fallibility and greater complexity of the conceptual level of knowledge is the essence of the role of volition. Were our consciousness non-volitional, it would also be infallible. The law of identity would necessitate all of our thoughts. But it can be observed that conceptual knowledge, by its nature, is not automatic. This is what makes it fallible. Your eyes cannot be wrong. Your conclusions can be. All conceptual knowledge (and therefore all words) takes for granted the conditional nature of this process, and therefore implicitly accepts volition.

To say, “I am a determinist,” is to say “I believe it is wrong to believe in free will,” is to say, “I believe it is wrong to believe that human knowledge can be evaluated.” This is a contradiction, as that itself is an evaluation.

It is impossible to logically and consistently believe in the non-existence of free will. To make any statement is to imply that it is true and therefore wrong to disagree with it, and the whole conception of “right and wrong” depends on volition. The statement “free will doesn’t exist” could only be true in a universe without conceptual beings, i.e. without words, i.e. where the statements itself could not exist.

Not that we know that it is illogical not to believe in free will, it can be demonstrated that it is certainly not illogical to believe in it.

Discounting Arguments Against Volition

Free will does not contradict identity, does not contradict causality, science cannot discount it, and is ‘complete’ in every meaningful sense.

It is asserted that free will is the belief of mystics, that it is non-objective and anti-causal. This is itself an irrational implementation of the mind-body dichotomy, which is false. Like those who assert that matter and consciousness cannot both exist, and that belief in the existence of non-material consciousness brings one outside the realm of logic, those who assert that free will contradicts the law of identity or causality need to be answered with a single word, which they cannot account for: “Why?” (Perhaps it is relevant that this happens to be the question that the determinist theory cannot accept as relevant, as the term is inapplicable to those who believe that all of our conclusions are necessary.)

The fact is that matter and consciousness both exist and integrate with the other, that free will and the law of causality are real, and that we know this because we observe it, because it is self-evident. Those who assert that consciousness or free will contradict material existence are playing what I call “Kant’s Big Lie,” which Ayn Rand mentions (without my label) in Ayn Rand Answers. They are adapting his method of asserting what reality should be, and expecting listeners to value their demands over factual observation. It is necessary that one withdraw the benefit of the doubt to those who expect the basic nature of the universe to conform to their arbitrary demands.

Those who claim that “all is matter” or that “all is spirit” are both making the same mistake, taking different sides of the same epistemological coin (Rand’s term,) trying to escape that which unites the two: the mind; that is, reason. The same goes for those who defend causality by denying free will or defend free will by denying causality.

The belief that free will contradicts identity usually (when it is merely an error by its better advocates) stems from their impression that, since man’s particular actions are not specifically necessitated by his nature, this would mean that his actions contradict his identity, and that a volitional consciousness is erratic and irrational. But this is not the case, and the subjectivist view of free will is equally (if not more) invalid as the concrete-bound, materialist view that the volitional is the subjective and therefore false (volition is not false, although the subjective is.) The determinists have no reason to associate the anti-causal advocates of free will with free will per se.

Actually, the faculty of free will is part of man’s specific identity. And, all actions possible to man, including those that are chosen, exist as part of a finite (yet incalculable) number of potential actions, which are all necessitated qua potential action by man’s identity, although not all of them actually take place. This is the only way that free will could exist.

This leads us to the issue of causality. Man’s actions are, although free, still caused, because it is man’s specific identity that allows (i.e. causes) all of his specific possibilities to exist. And from his choice of the basic motive “to think or not to think” onwards, all of man’s decisions act on mechanical causality; the choice to focus, or to evade, or to de-focus, the fundamental choice, is the mind’s non-mechanical selection of which cause should motivate one’s actions. Volitional beings still act within their nature. The law of causality still always applies.

An individual has the ability to only select a specific type of action in one’s life, accepting one’s existence qua rational being as the cause of all of one’s actions, even though one did not have to do so, so that he is simultaneously free, rational, and orderly. And those who do choose to be irrational will face specific, hazardous results because of this, despite their wish for the course of their life to be illogical; instead, their life will lead to the logical result of their irrationality: destruction.

The free is not the erratic. In fact, it is only the existence of free will that makes the concept “rationality” meaningful, as non-volitional cognition is neither rational nor irrational but merely there.

The claim has been made that the definition of “mechanical causality” that I present is the proper definition of the law of causality per se, and that volition contradicts it (which it does.) I will account for this, not by debating the proper definition, but merely by temporarily accepting that of my opponents. By that definition, the law of causality is neither axiomatic nor absolute. There is no reason to believe that all causality must be linear, that all actions must be directly necessitated by the possessor.

It is only by the type of definition that I have provided (which Leonard Peikoff uses in OPAR) that the law of causality is irrefutable. One cannot deny it without accepting that one’s denial itself is acting within its nature. But there is no basis on which to assert that all entities must act with mechanical causality. Why can they not, as we have observed humans do, select from multiple possible course of action caused by their nature? The only definition of “law of causality” that can be held as axiomatic and absolute does not contradict free will; one that does contradict free will is not axiomatic and absolute. This presents to us to a defense of the Objectivist definition: the best meaning for a fundamental metaphysical law is the one that is fundamental and absolute, not one that acts as a mere label for a certain instance of a metaphysical law. Causality merely means that the actions of existents are caused by their nature, not that they are necessitated; to be caused is not to be necessitated, but to be made possible by the identity of the object involved.

It has been claimed that science has led to evidence that free will does not exist. First of all, as I am a follower of contemporary physics, let me state that there is no consensus on this and that it is not accepted in the field to believe that volition has been disproved. “The status of free will and its role within fundamental physical law remain unsolved.” (1) Further more, because (unknown to most scientists, and it will eventually kill the industry if unchanged) the scientific method and the validity of the physical sciences exist within a (proper) philosophical context, such as the validity of logic and sense perception, the conclusions of physics are necessarily preceded by the conclusions of rational philosophy. One would likely say that this amounts to “philosophy comes first,” which is in a sense true but is also misleading. Reason comes first. A philosophy developed with reason is a pre-requisite of the scientific method, and scientific conclusions which contradict rational philosophy are outside the realm of science in the actual, justified sense. Rational scientific induction and rational philosophy do not contradict. To establish with science that free will does not exist is no more possible than to establish with science that you the observer, or science itself, does not exist; it is a contradiction.

The scientific method is the product of man’s conceptual faculty, and takes for granted the fallible nature of human cognition. It also accepts, above all, the validity of direct perception. All of these facts demonstrate that science rests on the existence of free will.

I theorize that scientists who claim to have disproved free will are doing so as the result of a mistake in the intellectual realm, which they have not approached scientifically. For example, they may show that the neurons in our brain act in a certain way, which they can prove, but as a philosophical issue, have taken this fact as indicating that free will does not exist, even though it does not indicate this. By accepting a mistaken philosophical syllogism, they can make assertions about philosophy that are allegedly backed by science but are not. If one asserts “I think that if 2+2=4, then free will is imaginary, and I can prove mathematically that 2+2=4, so free will doesn’t exist,” one has not “mathematically proven that free will is impossible;” one is merely taking a mathematical truth as means of establishing a separate conclusion in the field of philosophy, that is not the necessary result of one’s valid conclusions in one’s specialized field (such as physics neurology or math.)

Remaining are allegations about the possibility of “partial free will.” This can mean one of two things. A, that the entire universe is not the result of choice. B, that our free decisions are weighted by demons inside of us. The first is obviously true, and an objective reality is a prerequisite to consciousness, not to speak of volitional consciousness. The fact of volition, for example, needs to be necessarily true before volition can exist. No one denies that certain facts are independent of human choice, except those with a fundamentally irrational view of the universe.

The second interpretation is certainly false. “A free will saddled with tendency is like a game with loaded dice.” (2) Remembering the fallibility of knowledge issue, in order for conclusions to be qualified as valid or invalid (which all statements assume,) our volition must be pure and actual. “Tendency” as part of free will is an incorrect rationalization that falsifies the issue entirely. Once tendency is introduced at all, there is no where to draw the line, and one is no longer responsible for one’s assertions. For something to actually be the product of one’s choice, it must be purely the product of one’s choice. That is, one must have complete power over whether or not to accept any idea, despite the fact that all of our cognitive processes must be consistent with the nature of our mind. And these truths are not mutually exclusive.

Free will does not contradict the law of identity or the law of causality, has not (and cannot) be disproved by the scientific method, and exists pure where it does exist, although not all of existence is the result of it.

Citations

(1) Brian Greene, “The Fabric of the Cosmos.” Vintage Books, Copyright 2004.
(2) Ayn Rand, “For The New Intellectual,” pg.137 (Galt’s Speech from Atlas Shrugged) Copyright 1957, 1961.

Reply to Tour de Force in Defence of Volition

First, I would like a definition of ‘direct.’ You say we have ‘direct’ experience of free will, and I don’t see how we do. We have direct experience of the intuition that we have free will. But that’s one step divorced from free will itself. Or are you using it in a different sense?
Also, I would like a definition or explication of the law of identity and human nature and stuff. I can’t find anything for it.

I think your use of the word ‘direct’ is contradictory:

1) Most actions are mechanically determined (say you).
2) To think or not to think is the only choice (say you).
3) Free will is self-evident and directly observable (say you).
4) But other choices seem to us to be free (self-evident).

So, free will is directly observable and therefore undeniable, but if we commit an act that seems free that isn’t ‘to think or not to think,’ we are deluded? So is free will deniable or not? As far as I’m concerned, that we have volition is no more self-evident or directly known than that we humans by nature desire change (say). We appear to know it. We appear to have volition. Volition itself is not directly experienced, if I understand your meaning of direct correctly.

My second problem with your post is that you seem to have a very strong division between ‘thinking’ and ‘not thinking’ creatures (or ‘focusing’ and ‘not focusing,’ if you prefer). Animals don’t think; humans do. Babies don’t think; grown men do. People with mental illness don’t think; socialists d – um...
Anyway: at what point does the magic Thought Fairy drop down and grant us the ability to choose whether or not to think? (The ‘us’ in that sentence can refer either to us personally or us as a species.)

Speaking of that fundamental choice: what is it about the choice of whether or not to focus that singles it out as the only choice we have? Why can’t we choose anything else? Less trivially, what determines our decision if given that choice? I think we are forced down one of the following paths:
1) Our nature decides what we choose. But I thought that this choice was what decided what our nature was? If our nature decides this, you still have to say what decides our nature; if it is inherit from the moment we are conceived, then there’s no free will involved.
2) We are mechanically determined by external influences (genes, upbringing, etc.). But this doesn’t help your cause.
3) It is random what we choose. Again, this doesn’t help your cause.

To say, "I am a determinist," is to say "I believe it is wrong to believe in free will," is to say, "I believe it is wrong to believe that human knowledge can be evaluated." This is a contradiction, as that itself is an evaluation.

A few problems with this. The second statement does not follow from the first; we do not imply a moral judgement with every statement we make. And even if we did, we could consider it a virtue for everyone else to be mistaken about free will. However, I think this is just a stepping-stone to your third point, and I have absolutely no idea what that means. Define evaluate. And explain generally, if you would be so kind.

You say that maybe we’re able to choose between courses of action and still act within causality. That maybe mechanical causality isn’t the only plausible theory. Maybe, the identity/nature theory of causality is the right one, where mechanical causality gets us so far, but that from then on it’s choice.
I think this doesn’t answer the question. If we act, we need to say why we acted such a way. It’s specific. If you say mechanical causality gets us so far, you still have to say what gets us further and allows us to pick a course of action. Free will may fill the gap between mechanical causality and our acts that you have hypothesised; but you haven’t proved it. It’s no less mystical than before.

What I consider your strongest argument is the one that runs, ‘all our mechanical senses are infallible, if our consciousness were mechanical, it too would be infallible.’ But I still think this is wrong. Your definition of infallible seems to be ‘an infallible thing acts, without interpretation, on whatever qualia it is presented with.’ If our eye sees a pencil that appears bent, then that is exactly what it will send to our brain. It won’t interpret or correct the image. Fair enough.
But then you say that if our mind was mechanical, then it, too, would be infallible, and it sounds like you’re saying that we would never make mistakes; that our actions would always correspond with reality. Here, you’re equivocating. If our consciousness was infallible, then it would act, without interpretation, on whatever qualia it was presented with. I know I’m not being clear, so let me try and clarify.
Our eyes act on what they see. They project to our brain what they see. What they see, however, are qualia - that is, the properties of the objects that exist, not the object itself. They are infallible, in that they don’t pretend they see what they don’t, but they are inaccurate in that an object’s qualia, to the eye, may not correspond with the object itself.
Similarly with the mind, we may think that something is in our interests, or whatever, because the qualia that reach our minds imply it. So we act on them, only to find they didn’t correspond with the objects of the qualia. So, we’ve made a mistake, but are also at the same time infallible.
Am I making sense? I don’t think I’m using the standard definition of qualia. Another objection to this is that it does not follow that because all other sense organs are mechanical and accurate that the mind would be, too. This is the problem of induction, but I can just about understand where you’re coming from.

And now, what are my reasons for not believing in complete free will? Because if you believe in free will, you say that everyone can be whatever they want, and that we shouldn’t give to charity, because if you can succeed, why can’t they? And that’s just not so. It means that you’re against there being any public healthcare, because people should be able to pay health insurance. And to ask some of the people whom my mother treats – she’s a psychiatrist – to do this is just inhuman, and to think that there is no reason they can’t, except for lack of strength of will, is just ridiculous. I know there’s no way to work out where free will stops and determinism begins, but to use this, as you have, as a reason for accepting the existence of free will is wrong.
To expect me to be as great a composer at 18 as a man trained from childhood, and who has perfect pitch, and who is just plain more musical than me is not good for my mental health, either.
MAF said that giving to charity stank of treating other people as more important than himself. He never gave reasons, but I think maybe I can guess that it’s because they should be able to work for themselves, and they shouldn’t get more than they should earn, unless, of course, they’re better than other people, and no-one fundamentally is. But this assumes they can earn. If they can’t, through no fault of their own, charity no longer has that connotation.

So ends this. It’s not terribly well structured, but I look forward to hearing what you have to say. What I haven’t responded to are what I consider irrelevant, small sentences that seemed insignificant, or which a reply would make this o’erlong reply longer still, and things I agree with (and there were some of those, honest).