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There is another option in relation to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Rather than making the taxpayer liable for debts the debts of the government-sponsored enterprises, it would be more sensible to effect a smooth, prepackaged reorganisation plan. This could be done quite simply and would strengthen the GSEs’ ability to meet their congressionally mandated purpose of supporting liquidity in the secondary mortgage market.

The core of the GSEs’ mission is to purchase mortgages from mortgage originators, charge a guarantee fee to issuers to protect their ability to stand behind these loans, and securitise these mortgage-backed securities with assurances to MBS holders they would receive 100 per cent of their anticipated returns. To this end the GSEs have guaranteed $3,500bn in mortgage-backed securities These securities are backed by real housing assets and there is little question that, assuming they are well serviced, there will be relatively little loss over a longer period.

As part of a prepackaged reorganisation the government could explicitly assure MBS investors they will receive all of their guaranteed interest payments. Instead of giving ineffective management a line of credit, Treasury could provide the GSEs’ regulator with a line of credit used to assure timely payments on these obligations. This is the tool that Treasury provides the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with to sort out failed banks. Over time that line will be repaid by the running-off of the portfolios, active servicing of mortgages and through payment of claims by private mortgage insurers who guaranteed first losses on GSE mortgages. Because these debts are core to the GSEs’ social mission and real assets back these debts, this would be an appropriate resolution.

The next step would create approximately $150bn in new equity capital and enable to GSEs, without governmental support, to achieve more fully their chartered mission.

Over the past decade the GSEs have increasingly used their portfolios to speculate in aircraft leasing, manufactured housing, interest-only mortgages and other securities they are specifically prohibited from buying as part of their mission. In recent years, through these portfolios they funded nearly 50 per cent of the riskier private label Alt-A mortgage market, invested in aircraft lease securities, manufactured housing and other assets that leveraged them into trouble. To achieve this speculative, hedge fund-like growth they issued almost $1,500bn of senior corporate debt. By their investments, debt buyers supported speculation in non-mission-related activities and did so with a clear understanding they were funding non-mission-related activities. They also knew GSE debt was explicitly not an obligation of the US taxpayer and that was repeated constantly by the government and the companies.

In exchange for their current debt, these holders should receive 90 cents on the dollar of new, long-dated, senior debt in the companies and 10 cents of new subordinated debt. The companies would then have enough capital to support their core, chartered mission and could increase the social returns and financial returns of investors in their core mission. This approach would send a very strong signal, from the government, that investors fully consider the risks of bad asset allocation. It would almost certainly strengthen the dollar. Though it would cause pain for equity and subordinated debt investors, those investors received the majority of returns over the past several years and, in our great system, they are supposed to be subordinated.